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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study was to conduct a detailed examination of the ways
mothers use mental verbs in conversations with three- and four-year-old chil-
dren, and to link these usages to the children’s developing understanding of
mental verbs and a theory of mind. Sixty three- and four-year-olds, either
attending preschool (PS) or not (NPS) were given tasks assessing mental verb
distinctions and false belief. Their mothers’ mental verb use was coded for (a)
frequency, (b) type of utterance, (c) type of subordinate clause, (d) the per-
son of the subject of the verb, and (e) the certainty of think. Within the
three-year-olds, the NPS children performed significantly better on the men-
tal verb comprehension task; moreover, compared to the PS mothers, the NPS
mothers were found to use: (1) less statements and more questions, (2) less
first person utterances and more second person utterances, and (3) think in
its ‘very certain’ form less often. In regression analyses, children’s mental verb
and false belief performance were positively predicted by maternal mental
verb 1) questions, and 2) single clause utterances; the children’s performance
was negatively predicted by statements. These findings indicate how mater-
nal input has the potential to promote or hinder children’s understanding of
the mind.
FIRST
LANGUAGE
ARTICLE
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016fla.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
KEYWORDS
Language; maternal input; mental verbs; social-cognitive development; theory of
mind
INTRODUCTION
Conversation has become increasingly recognized as crucial for children’s develop-
ment related to the mental world. For example, numerous chapters in Astington &
Baird (2005) discuss how conversation, both between peers and between children
and their caregivers, can be revealing concerning the notion of a theory of mind
(ToM); that is, that all people have minds and that what is in minds can differ
between people and from reality (Wellman, 1990). One aspect of conversation –
the use of cognitive terms such as think – has been demonstrated to be particularly
relevant because these terms: (a) provide labels for unseen relations (Adrian,
Clemente & Villanueva, 2005; Dunn & Brophy, 2005; Furrow, Moore, Davidge &
Chiasson, 1992; Ruffman, Slade & Crowe, 2002); (b) are sometimes presented in
sentence complements which enable contrasts between matrix and subordinate
clause truth values (J. deVilliers, 2005; P. deVilliers, 2005; Hale & Tager-Flusberg,
2005); and/or (c) facilitate discussions in which differing points of view are
contrasted (Dunn & Brophy, 2005; Harris, 2005; Lohmann, Tomasello & Meyer,
2005; Slaughter, Peterson & Mackintosh, 2007).
In this paper, we continue this line of research, investigating in detail how caregiver
use of mental verbs might help children to learn about the mental world. We target
children’s acquisition of mental verbs such as think, guess and know as our primary
dependent variables. Because these are arbitrary linguistic symbols for specific men-
tal states and processes, they must be acquired from specific way(s) that caregivers
and others use them in conversation. Whereas most investigations of the roles of
mental state talk in ToM development have combined the uses of many different
mental verbs, we will investigate how specific uses of specific mental verbs might help
children learn these verbs – and, to the extent that mental verbs (MV) and ToM share
antecedents, how they develop a ToM as well.
Challenges to children’s mental verb acquisition
Mental verbs are challenging for children to learn for a number of reasons. First,
MVs are not common in either adult or child spontaneous speech; they are pro-
duced only in about 10% of utterances across languages and contexts and so rep-
resent relatively little of any given child’s input (Adrian et al., 2007; Furrow et al.,
1992; Slaughter et al., 2007; Tardif & Wellman, 2000). Second, MVs refer to intan-
gible relations and processes, difficult to glean from the visuo-spatial scene
(Gleitman, 1990; Gleitman, Cassidy & Nappa, 2005; Montgomery, 2002). Third,
mental verbs may have a number of different semantic senses, and distinguishing
these in the input is not transparent (Naigles, 2000; see also Booth, Hall, Robison &
Kim, 1997). For example, know may be used to indicate certainty (‘I know that
it’s sunny outside’), shared information (‘You know, it’s almost time to leave’), or
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communication (‘Let me know if you want some help with that’), whereas think
typically describes processes (‘I’m thinking about alligators’) or uncertain states
(‘I think it’s raining outside’). However, think also includes a ‘comment clause’ sense
which is used to indicate certainty, particularly in the speech of adults to children
(‘I think it’s time for your nap’; Manson, 1995; Naigles, 2000; Urmson, 1952). Thus,
distinguishing between think’s ‘canonical’ uncertain sense and ‘comment’ certain
sense presents a challenge for the young mental verb learner.
Probably because of such challenges, children’s development of MVs begins later
than that of concrete verbs, and has a longer trajectory. Know emerges first, but only
in its conversational use (‘know what?’), by 28 months of age; references to actual
mental states develop around three years of age (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Furrow
et al., 1992; Shatz, Wellman & Silber, 1983). Around four years of age, children
begin using MVs more distinctively both in production and comprehension (Frank &
Hall, 1991; Moore, Bryant & Furrow, 1989). For example, Moore et al. (1989) found
that among children aged three to eight, three-year-olds performed at chance in dis-
tinguishing know as more certain than think whereas four-year-olds performed
above chance (albeit not perfectly). It was not until the children were eight years of
age that they correctly distinguished think as more certain than guess (see also
Moore & Davidge, 1989). Indeed, mental verb understanding continues to develop
into grade school, with seven- to nine-year-olds understanding more of the plethora
of know senses and further distinguishing think and know on information process-
ing dimensions (Booth & Hall, 1995; Schwanenflugel, Fabricius & Noyes, 1996).
Environmental influences on MV development
Thus far, the predominant aspect of conversations that has been demonstrated to
influence children’s mental verb acquisition is maternal frequency of use. On a gen-
eral level, mothers use more desire terms than belief terms when their children are
two-years-old, but steadily increase their frequency of use of belief terms over the
course of the next year, mirroring the children’s increased use (Beeghly, Bretherton &
Mervis, 1986; Brown & Dunn, 1991; Moore, Furrow, Chiasson & Patriquin, 1994;
Jenkins, Turrell, Kogushi, Lollis & Ross, 2003). More specifically, mothers’ frequency
of use of belief words when their children were two years of age predicted the chil-
dren’s frequency of use at the ages of two, three, and four years, as well as their
mental verb comprehension at age four (Jenkins et al., 2003; Moore et al., 1994),
and mothers’ use of mental terms for true mental reference when children were age
two predicted the children’s use of such words in these same functions when they
were age three (Furrow et al., 1992). Relatedly, Ruffman et al. (2002) have reported
that mothers’ frequency of mental state utterances was a strong predictor of their
children’s theory of mind performance across the age range of three to five years.
These findings from prior studies of maternal-child conversations suggest that chil-
dren’s development of mental state verbs, and thus (at least partially) a theory of
mind, is fostered by the frequency of maternal mental verb utterances. The question
arises, however, whether frequency of use is the only (or even major) influence. Recall
that Furrow et al. (1992) found some preliminary evidence that the way(s) the moth-
ers used the verbs were reflected in their children’s subsequent uses. In this paper, we
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investigate this possibility in more detail, considering a variety of ways that mothers
might use mental verbs in conversations. In particular, we will investigate maternal
use of mental verbs: (a) to refer to self versus other, (b) capturing certain versus uncer-
tain senses, (c) in different types of subordinate clauses, and (d) in questions versus
statements. We address each of these components of mental verbs below.
Booth et al. (1997) hypothesized that uses of know to refer to others would pro-
mote advances in MV use via an understanding of different perspectives. Indeed, the
parents of four children from the CHILDES database (MacWhinney & Snow, 1985)
used know equivalently in self and other references when their children were 27–45
months of age, but then used know more to refer to others when their children were
51–57 months of age, mirroring their children’s use of know more in reference to
themselves during the earlier period and more in reference to others during the later
period. The parents’ shift in usage may have simply primed the children’s, as both
were drawn from the same conversations; however, Adrian et al. (2007) showed that
mothers who used MVs more in reference to their children, and to characters in a
storybook, had children who subsequently performed better on a battery of mental
state understanding tasks. We will further address this hypothesis in the current
study.
As discussed above, the verb think can be used in both a ‘canonical’ uncertain
sense and a ‘comment’ certain sense. Frequent uses of the ‘comment’ certain sense
have the potential to hinder or at least slow down children’s development of the
certainty distinction between think and know. Naigles (2000) reported a small-
scale study in which children viewed a television show that included many instances
of the ‘comment’ sense of think; those children performed more poorly than non-
viewing controls on tests of mental verb understanding. In this study, we will com-
pare how children whose everyday conversations include greater versus fewer
‘comment’ uses of think perform on such mental verb tasks.
Parental use of modal auxiliaries (e.g., might, must, could, should) might also play
a role in children’s understanding of mental verbs, as these modals describe how the
speaker evaluates her message (Shatz & Wilcox, 1991). Especially, mothers who use
mental verb utterances containing modal auxiliaries may more effectively communi-
cate their own mental state to their children, in that they are providing additional
information concerning their own degree of certainty about the likelihood of the
proposition (compare ‘I think we should go outside’ with ‘I think it’s time to go out-
side’). In this study, we examine whether maternal uses of subjunctive clauses, which
contain these modal auxiliaries, might aid in children’s acquisition of the certainty dis-
tinctions among mental verbs as well as their understanding of mental representa-
tions in general.
An additional aspect of parental conversations that might influence children’s
acquisition of mental verbs is utterance type; specifically, the use of questions ver-
sus statements or directives. Questions may provide specific assistance in MV acqui-
sition because they are the medium by which children’s thoughts and perspectives
can be highlighted or made the topic of discussion (e.g., Dunn & Brophy, 2005).
Indeed, Adrian et al. (2007) have reported that maternal use of cognitive verbs in
question format significantly predicted subsequent overall mental state under-
standing; however, both they and Slaughter et al. (2007) report that certain kinds
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of mental verb statements (i.e., cognitive clarifications) also seem facilitative. In this
study, we investigated how children’s performance on MV tasks relates to their
mothers’ uses of MVs in different utterance types.
Summary and prospectus
The purpose of this study was to conduct a detailed examination of the ways moth-
ers use mental verbs in conversations with three- and four-year-old children, and to
link these usages to the children’s developing understanding of mental verbs and a
theory of mind. Given that MVs comprise such a small percentage of the utterances
in spontaneous conversation (less than 10%), we sought an additional manipula-
tion to increase the variation of the sample and thus the likelihood of finding sig-
nificant effects. Previous research has reported that children’s understanding of MVs
and/or a ToM varies by the amount of schooling they have had (e.g., Naigles, 2000;
Vinden, 2002); however, these studies may have confounded schooling and SES,
which also seems to have an effect (Shatz, Diesendruck, Martinez-Beck &
Akar, 2003). Because most North American samples include only children attending
preschool, we were interested in whether children at a given socio-economic level,
either attending preschool or not, might vary in their MV and/or ToM understand-
ing. And because the decision to send a three- or four-year-old to preschool (or not)
is a choice (within the upper-middle SES) that reflects differences in parenting
philosophy, parents who make different decisions are likely also to vary in relevant
aspects of their conversations with their children (Dunn & Brown, 1991;
Hohenstein, Naigles & Marsland, 1998; Rogoff, Mistry, Goncu & Mosier, 1991).
Thus, in this study we tested two groups of children: those who attended pre-
school or daycare for at least three hours per week, and those who did not attend
any preschool or daycare. The children were given a battery of tasks assessing MV
understanding, ToM development and general language abilities; all were tested at
home. The children were also videotaped for 30 minutes while interacting with their
mothers; these interactions provided the data to analyze maternal input. The focus
of the present study concerns the mothers’ conversations with their children and,
specifically, how differences between the two groups of mothers (i.e., those whose
children do vs. do not attend preschool) may account for the variation in mental
verb understanding of the children. We hypothesized that children’s mental verb
understanding and false belief performance would be positively related to higher
frequencies of maternal mental verb utterances (a) promoting varied thoughts and
perspectives, (b) containing modal auxiliaries, (c) referring to others, and (d) includ-
ing ‘uncertain’ rather than ‘certain’ uses of think.
METHOD
Participants
Sixty children (32 three-year-olds, 28 four-year-olds) and their mothers were
recruited for participation in the study through preschools and library story hours in
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northeastern Connecticut, USA. The final sample consisted of 16 three-year-old pre-
school attendees (8 girls, 8 boys; M age 3.7 years, SD  0.21), 16 three-year-old
preschool non-attendees (9 girls, 7 boys; M age  3.5 years, SD  0.33), 16 four-
year-old preschool attendees (9 girls, 7 boys; M age  4.5 years, SD  0.36), and
12 four-year-old preschool non-attendees (6 girls, 6 boys; M age 4.4 years, SD 
0.34). The majority of the children were from White, middle- to upper-class subur-
ban or rural homes in northeastern Connecticut. The amount of time that the pre-
school-attending children (PS) spent in the classroom ranged from 3 to 45 hours per
week (M  20.5 hours, SD  16.4 hours). The non-attending preschool children
(NPS) were not enrolled in any conventional preschool or daycare program. All the
children were native speakers of American English.
Materials
The children were administered the Test for Auditory Comprehension of Language
(TACL-3; Carrow-Woolfolk,1999), which included subsections on vocabulary, gram-
matical morphemes and elaborated phrases and sentences. The TACL-3 has been
normed including ethnic majority, minority and language-impaired samples, vali-
dated against other standardized tests for good item discrimination, and shown to
be reliable across time both within and across subsections (Carrow-Woolfolk,
1999). For each item, the child was presented with three pictures, one of which cor-
responded to a spoken stimulus. The child was then asked to point to the picture
that represented the spoken stimulus. Administration proceeded until the child
chose an incorrect picture on three consecutive trials.
Two mental verb tasks and two theory-of-mind tasks were administered in a
counterbalanced order. An adaptation of Moore et al. (1989) was used to assess the
child’s understanding of the certainty distinctions between think, know and guess.
In this ‘puppet show’ game, the child was presented with two different colored
boxes and was told that a sticker was hidden in one of them. Two puppets, Jazz
(a cow) and George (a cat), each gave the child different clues as to the location of
a hidden sticker, distinguishing think, know and guess. For example:
Jazz says: ‘I think it’s in the blue box.’
George says: ‘I know it’s in the yellow box.’
The child was then asked to identify the box that they believed contained the
sticker.
To confirm that the child understood the rules of the game, three practice trials
were administered. The clues in the practice trials were based only on negation
(e.g., ‘it’s in the blue box’ or ‘it’s not in the yellow box’). All children passed at least
one of each valence of the practice trials; most passed all three. The 12 test trials
(4 items for each of the pairwise comparisons of think, know and guess) followed.
The trials were counterbalanced for order of verb pair, color of correct box, speaker
(Jazz or George), and whether the correct box was designated in the first or second
clue. After the child indicated the box in which he/she believed the sticker to be,
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the chosen box was set aside to rule out any reinforcement of a particular box color
or puppet. Only the child’s answers to the eight comparisons of think-know and
know-guess were analyzed, as previous studies have shown that children under
eight years of age do not reliably distinguish between think and guess (Moore et
al., 1989). Therefore, the puppet task yielded a possible score of zero to eight, with
one point given for each correctly chosen box.
The second task assessing mental verb understanding involved stickers hidden
around a toy Noah’s ark set (Tager-Flusberg, 2000). The child was told that Noah
and Sarah had hidden their stickers around their ark, but they could not remember
who hid their stickers in which places. The experimenter revealed each sticker’s hid-
ing place, and Noah and Sarah then gave clues as to which of them had hidden the
sticker in that particular place. For example:
Noah says: ‘I think I hid my sticker next to the ark.’
Sarah says: ‘I know I hid my sticker next to the ark.’
The child was then asked to point to the doll that he believed had hidden the
sticker. The trials were counterbalanced for verb, order of speaker, and level of cer-
tainty each doll indicated.
As with the puppet task, three practice trials and 12 test trials were given. The
key difference between the hiding task and the puppet show task was the manner
in which the clues were given. In the hiding task, the sticker is identified and the
unknown is who hid it, whereas in the puppet task, the sticker is hidden and
the unknown is where it is. The hiding task was scored in the same manner as the
puppet task, in that the trials containing guess were omitted, yielding a possible
final score of zero to eight.
Two standard false-belief tasks assessed the children’s theory of mind: an unex-
pected contents task and a change-of-location task. In the unexpected contents task
(Perner, Leekam & Wimmer, 1987) the child was first presented with an opaque Band-
Aid box, which actually contained balloons. The child was asked, ‘What do you think
is inside here?’ After his/her response, the child was shown the actual contents of the
box. The box was then closed and the child was asked, ‘What is really inside of this?’
The two test questions were then administered, which consisted of asking the child:
(1) ‘What did you think was in this box before we opened it?’ and (2) ‘What would
your friend X think was in the box if we showed it to him/her?’ The child was given
one point for each correct answer, resulting in a possible score of 0–2. In the change-
of-location task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), the child was introduced to Astro, a cow
puppet, and was told Astro wanted to play a new game. Astro told the children that
she would be taking a trip soon and needed to pack her toy monkey in her blue suit-
case, represented by a blue box. After putting the monkey inside the box, Astro left
for the grocery store. After reassuring the children that Astro was gone, the experi-
menter asked the children to play a trick on Astro by moving the monkey from the
blue box to the white box. Afterwards, the children were asked: ‘When Astro gets
back, where will she look for the monkey?’, and ‘Do you remember where Astro put
the monkey before he left?’ This task was also scored 0–2.
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Demographic information
During testing, the mother filled out a questionnaire regarding her and her hus-
band’s educational level, the number and ages of siblings, the number of hours
spent in daycare or preschool, the number of hours spent reading with her child,
and how many hours of television the child watched per week. The socio-economic
status was calculated using Hollingshead’s two-factor Index of Social Position (ISP;
Hollingshead, 1971). No significant differences were found between the PS and
NPS children on any of these demographic variables. Furthermore, no significant
differences were found between the three- and four-year-old PS children in the
number of hours spent in daycare or preschool.
Procedure
The child participants engaged in 30 minutes of naturalistic interaction with their
mothers before being administered the experimental tasks in counterbalanced
order. The context of the interaction varied widely, including mealtime, cooking,
arts and crafts, or toy play. However, in order to provide a similar context for each
dyad, as well as to help to elicit mental verb usage, each mother-child pair was
asked to play a memory game that involved finding matching sets of cards. Most of
the dyads played this game for an average of five minutes.
The TACL-3 was then administered to each child. The remaining tasks (i.e., the
mental verb and false belief tasks) were presented in a counterbalanced order. The
child’s parents were permitted to remain during testing, but they were prohibited
from making comments directly relating to the tasks. Testing for each child lasted
approximately 20 to 30 minutes.
Coding of interactions
The mother-child interactions were first transcribed. Due to missing videos from
three children (three-year-old PS children), only 57 of the original 60 children were
included. After transcription, utterances containing the five most frequent mental
verbs, which were think, know, remember, guess and forget, were extracted. Other
mental verbs (e.g., pretend, understand) appeared fewer than 5 times across all
transcripts. These remaining utterances were then coded for: (a) frequency, (b) type
of utterance (i.e., wh-question, y/n-question, statement, or directive), (c) presence
and mood of subordinate clause (i.e., subjunctive clause, finite clause, or no clause),
(d) the person of the subject of the verb (i.e., first, second or third person), and (e)
semantics (i.e., certainty of think). These coding schemes are described in more
detail below.
Overall frequency
The frequency of mental verb utterances produced by each mother and child was
tabulated. However, to compare the mental verb input frequency of the mothers of
PS and NPS children, the relative amount of overall speech needed to be controlled.
Therefore, when calculating a mother’s mean frequency of each mental verb, the
number of times she used that verb was divided by her total number of utterances
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throughout the 30 minutes of interaction. Subsequently, the mean frequency of
each mental verb was calculated for the group as a whole (i.e., mothers of PS chil-
dren and mothers of NPS children). Table 1 presents the mothers’ mean frequency
for each mental verb by age and preschool status of their children. Given that the
mothers of the three-year-old NPS children produced significantly more utterances
than the other three groups, percentages rather than raw frequencies of mental
verb use are displayed and analyzed.
A repeated measures ANOVA (Age x Preschool x Verb) yielded a significant effect
of mental verb (F(4, 171)  62.78, p  0.001). Post-hoc t-tests using a Bonferroni
correction of alpha levels revealed that think (4.95%) and know (5.07%) were pro-
duced significantly more than remember (2.81%) (ts(56)  4.61, ps  0.001), which
was produced significantly more than forget (0.43%) and guess (0.26%) (ts(56) 
6.42, ps  0.001). No interactions between verb, age or preschool status of the
child were significant. Because forget and guess comprised such a small percentage
of the maternal mental verb uses, these were not analyzed further.
Utterance type
Each utterance containing think, know or remember was coded as one of four
types: wh-question, yes/no-question, statement, or directive/imperative; examples
are given in Table 2.
Subordinate clause type
Each think, know and remember utterance was also parsed according to syntactic
frame. These utterances were then coded for the type of subordinate clause it con-
tained, if any. The four types of clauses were ‘diagnosed’ by the type of auxiliary, as
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Table 1 Maternal input frequency of mental verbs: percentage means and (in
brackets) standard deviations
N Think Know Remember Guess Forget Total uttsa
3-year-olds
PS mothers 13 4.75 5.37 1.84 0.69 0.36 2685
(4.20) (5.32) (2.27) (1.08) (0.47)
NPS mothers 16 4.58 3.38 2.50 0.35 0.21 4836
(3.18) (2.17) (2.23) (0.64) (0.26)
4-year-olds
PS mothers 16 5.45 6.45 3.81 0.42 0.24 3181
(2.87) (3.13) (4.04) (0.37) (0.53)
NPS mothers 12 5.05 5.40 3.18 0.30 0.21 2613
(2.39) (2.73) (2.76) (0.44) (0.35)
Note. Means are the average of the percentage score for each mother. The percentage score was
calculated by dividing the number of occurrences of each verb (e.g., think, know, etc.) per mother
by the total number of utterances for the mother.
a Total number of utterances for the group.
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Table 2 Coding of maternal utterances
Category Subcategory Example
Utterance Wh-question What do you think? / Who knows what this is?
Yes/no-question Do you know what this is? / Remember
this?
Statement I remember where it is. / I know that song.
Directive/imperative Think about it. / Remember where you put it.
Subordinate clause Subjunctive What do you think we should do?
Tensed Didn’t you know he was in the room?
No clause I don’t know.
Miscellaneous You know how to play this.
Certainty Very certain Very assertive tone while teaching, guiding,
or correcting child with the intent of letting
the child know what is expected of him (e.g.,
I think you should try and finish one game,
and then play with him, cause he’s a big kid.)
Certain Laughing yet correcting, or giving child
instructions in an upbeat tone (e.g., [giggle] I
don’t think you’ll be working on the roof.).
Also included utterances in which the mother
doesn’t sound entirely certain of what she’s
saying, but her utterance is backed up by
action (e.g., I think I forgot to shut Caitlin’s
door. [can hear Caitlin crying down the hall]).
Ambiguous Utterances that were unable to be classified
into one of the four categories (0–7% across
groups).
Uncertain Stating an opinion or belief that is, or could
be, contradicted (e.g., [in reference to
jaguars] I think they live in the jungle, we
need to look that up.).
Very uncertain Very unsure tone, emphasizing the word
think, pausing mid-sentence to reflect on
statement (e.g., I thought the piece was
here for the giraffe, and I…oh, I see over
here, I’m sorry…). These statements were
also commonly followed by ‘I don’t know,’
or contrasted with what the mother did
know (e.g., They are an animal that live
in…I think they live in Africa, they run really
fast, I know that.)
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follows (see Table 2 for examples): (a) subjunctive clause, containing modal auxil-
iaries such as should, could, would, might, etc., (b) tensed clause, containing
a tensed or finite verb, (c) no clause, and (d) miscellaneous, which included all
utterances that could not be classified in the first three categories (e.g., a subordi-
nate clause containing an infinitive, a sentence in which the mother trails off before
finishing her thought, etc.; N  42 across all groups).
Person
The person of each maternal think, know and remember utterance was also coded.
The utterance was coded as ‘first person’ if the mother referred to herself or to a group
including herself (e.g., I, we). The utterance was coded as ‘second person’ if the
mother referred to her child (e.g., you), and the utterance was coded as ‘third person’
if the mother referred to other people, animals, things, etc. (e.g., he, she, it, they).
Certainty
The certainty of the verb think, or whether the mother used think in its ‘certain’ or
‘uncertain’ sense, was also coded. Only think utterances classified as ‘statements’
were coded for level of certainty because the degree of certainty in questions is dif-
ficult to assess. The mere fact a question is asked may make a verb more uncertain.
Therefore, wh-questions, y/n-questions and directives were excluded. The total
number of think utterances that were coded on this parameter resulted in: 106 out
of 220 total think utterances (48%) for the three-year-old NPS mothers, 73 out of
126 total think utterances (58%) for the three-year-old PS mothers, 87 out of 147
total think utterances (59%) for the four-year-old NPS mothers, and 102 out of
169 total think utterances (60%) for the four-year-old PS mothers. Thus, approxi-
mately half of all think utterances were coded for certainty. The coding scheme
used to determine the certainty level of think ranged from 1 to 5, with 1 designat-
ing think as ‘very certain,’ and 5 distinguishing think as ‘very uncertain’.
Descriptions of the five categories are listed in Table 2. Another researcher, blind to
the hypothesis, coded all the target think utterances for level of certainty. Inter-rater
reliability between the two coders was at first 85%. Discussion followed until the
remaining 15% was agreed upon.
RESULTS
The results are organized into three sections, covering (a) the children’s performance
on the mental verb and false belief tasks, (b) the group comparisons of the maternal
uses of mental verbs, and (c) the regressions investigating the degree to which spe-
cific aspects of maternal mental verb use predict children’s individual performances.
Child mental verb and false belief performance
Mean scores for each group on the two mental verb tasks and two false belief tasks
can be found in Table 3. The four-year-olds performed significantly above chance
on the two mental verb tasks combined (t(27)  4.66, p  0.001), while the 
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three-year-olds performed at chance (t(31)  0.99, ns). On the two false belief tasks
combined, the four-year-olds performed above chance (t(27)  2.68, p 0.05),
while the three-year-olds approached significance in performing below chance
(t(31)  1.98, p  0.06). Three Age x Preschool ANOVAs compared the children’s
performance on (1) the puppet mental verb task, (2) the hiding mental verb task,
and (3) the two mental verb tasks combined. For all three analyses, an age effect
emerged in that the four-year-olds scored significantly higher on the puppet and
hiding mental verb tasks alone, as well as on the two mental verb tasks combined
(F(1, 56)  6.21, p  0.05 (partial 2  0.10); F(1, 56)  5.99, p  0.05 (partial
2  0.10); F(1, 56)  10.40, p  0.01 (partial 2  0.16), respectively). Although
no interactions with preschool were found, exploratory t-tests revealed that, among
the three-year-olds, the NPS children performed significantly higher on the puppet
task than the PS children (t(30)  2.09, p  0.05), thus demonstrating variance
among the PS and NPS children that might be related to variance in the maternal
speech. Three Age x Preschool ANOVAs further compared the children’s perform-
ance on (1) the unexpected contents task, (2) the unexpected location task, and (3)
the two tasks combined. No effects appeared for the unexpected contents task;
however, the four-year-olds performed significantly higher on the unexpected loca-
tion task (F(1, 56)  13.10, p  0.01, partial 2  0.19), and the preschool children
tended to perform higher on the same task (F(1, 56)  3.99, p  0.052, partial
2  0.07). For the two tasks combined, only an age effect appeared, in that the
four-year-olds performed significantly higher on both the tasks combined
(F(1, 56)  10.16, p  0.01, partial 2  0.15). With regard to the TACL scores
(see Table 4), four-year-olds again performed at a significantly higher level than
three-year-olds (F(1, 56)  29.81, p  0.001, partial 2  0.35).
Correlational analyses using the mental verb task scores, false belief task scores,
and the scores from the TACL-3 for all groups combined are presented in Table 5. As
Table 3 Means and (in brackets) standard deviations of scores on mental
verb understanding and false belief tasks
N Puppet1 Hiding1 UL2a UC2b
3-year-olds
PS 16 3.75 4.06 1.06 0.69
(0.93) (1.95) (0.68) (0.70)
NPS 16 4.69 4.44 0.81 0.63
(1.54) (1.63) (0.66) (0.89)
4-year-olds
PS 16 5.50 5.06 1.75 1.06
(1.79) (1.57) (0.45) (0.68)
NPS 12 5.08 5.58 1.33 1.00
(2.27) (1.51) (0.78) (0.85)
1 out of a possible 8; 2 out of a possible 2
a unexpected location task; b unexpected contents task
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Table 4 Means and (in brackets) standard deviations of raw scores on the Test for
Auditory Comprehension of Language (TACL-3)
N Vocabulary Morphemes Elaborated Total TACL
sentences
3-year-olds
PS 16 23.44 16.50 12.19 51.56
(4.87) (7.14) (5.36) (17.06)
NPS 16 21.75 13.13 13.00 46.75
(7.10) (5.50) (7.52) (15.96)
4-year-olds
PS 16 33.31* 21.56 20.63 75.81
(4.03) (8.88) (9.89) (19.97)
NPS 12 29.58* 20.33 18.00 68.25
(5.62) (4.87) (8.07) (12.61)
* p  0.052.
Table 5 Means, standard deviations and correlations among age, mental verb
understanding and false belief tasks (N  60)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 N M SD
1. Age – 60 4.00 0.54
2. TACL 0.68** – 60 60.08 19.87
3. MV 1a 0.33* 0.27** – 60 4.73 1.75
4. MV 2b 0.26* 0.24 0.37** – 60 4.73 1.74
5. MVUc 0.38* 0.31* 0.83** 0.82** – 60 9.43 2.84
6. UCd 0.21 0.28* 0.25 0.18 0.25 – 60 0.83 0.78
7. ULe 0.51** 0.54** 0.31* 0.19 0.32* 0.43** – 60 1.23 0.72
8. FBf 0.42** 0.48** 0.33* 0.22 0.32* 0.86** 0.83** 60 2.07 1.27
 p  0.07; * p  0.05; ** p  0.01
a puppet task (scored 0–8); b hiding task (scored 0–8); c total mental verb understanding score
(scored 0–16); d unexpected contents task (scored 0–2); e unexpected location task (scored 0–2); 
f total false belief score (scored 0–4)
the table shows, the scores from the two mental verb tasks were significantly corre-
lated, as were the scores from the two false belief tasks. Moreover, the children’s
score from a combination of both of the mental verb tasks was significantly related
to children’s performance on both of the false belief tasks combined. Finally, the chil-
dren’s raw scores from the language comprehension measure were significantly
associated with scores from the puppet task as well as with both false belief tasks.
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Maternal conversations
These analyses compared the mothers of three- and four-year-old PS and NPS 
children on the basis of their mental verb use in different types of utterances, in
different types of subordinate clauses, with different persons as the subjects, and
with different degrees of certainty.
Analysis strategy
Because the MVs comprised such a small percentage of the mothers’ total utter-
ances, we analyzed maternal usage of MVs out of their total mental verb use (see
Table 1). Maternal think, know and remember uses are thus presented as percent-
ages of total mental verb utterances (because forget and guess are included in the
total, think, know and remember percentages do not sum to 100). Finally, because
our data did not fully satisfy the assumptions of the independent tests (i.e., normal
distribution or homogeneity-of-variance), we also performed Mann-Whitney U tests,
which use rank order to evaluate two populations. These non-parametric analyses
allowed us to compare the PS versus the NPS groups directly (Gravetter & Wallnau,
2004). Overall, the non-parametric tests corroborated the main analyses; in a few
cases, they extended the parametric findings and are presented in footnotes.
Parametric analyses
The parametric analyses examined the effects of age and preschool status of the
child (between-subjects) as well as the effects of utterance type, clause type
and person on maternal percentage of think, know and remember uses (within-
subjects). Three-way ANOVAs were performed within each input category, one each
for think uses, know uses and remember uses. For all analyses, the Bonferroni alpha
correction was used to examine subsequent multiple comparisons upon the emer-
gence of a main effect and/or an interaction effect.
Utterance type
A Preschool x Age x Utterance type repeated measures ANOVA was first performed
with the verb think. Only a significant effect of utterance type was found (F(3,
159)  110.96, p  0.001, partial 2  0.68). A significantly higher percentage of
think utterances appeared in the form of statements (26.4%) than wh-questions
(4.6%; t(56)  10.34, p  0.001) or yes/no-questions (5.9%; t(56)  10.25,
p  0.001). Both types of questions appeared at significantly higher percentages than
directives (0.3%; t(56)  5.49, p  0.001; t(56)  6.82, p  0.001, respectively).
A second repeated-measures ANOVA was performed with the verb know. A sig-
nificant main effect of utterance type emerged (F(3, 159)  84.49, p  0.001, partial
2  0.86). Statements containing know were produced at significantly higher per-
centages than yes/no-questions containing know (23% vs. 14%; t(56)  3.51,
p  0.01). Moreover, yes/no-questions with know appeared at significantly higher
percentages than wh-questions (1%; t(56)  7.41, p  0.001), which appeared at
significantly higher percentages than directives (0.2%; t(56)  3.17, p  0.001). A
significant Preschool x Age x Utterance type interaction also emerged (F(3, 159) 
4.65 p  0.01, partial 2  0.15). Among the three-year-olds, the PS children heard
a significantly higher percentage of statements with know than the NPS children did
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(t(27)  2.76, p  0.05). No significant differences were found between the NPS
and PS mothers of the four-year-olds.
A third repeated-measures ANOVA was performed with the verb remember.
A main effect of utterance type emerged (F(3, 159)  43.16, p  0.001, partial 
2  0.72), demonstrating that remember appeared at significantly higher per-
centages in the form of yes/no-questions compared with statements (11% vs. 7%;
t(56)  2.49, p  0.05), which, in turn, appeared at significantly higher percent-
ages than directives and wh-questions (t(56)  5.31, p  0.001; t(56)  5.84,
p  0.001). A significant Preschool x Utterance type interaction also emerged
(F(3, 159)  4.34, p  0.01, partial 2  0.17), indicating that the NPS mothers
overall used a significantly higher percentage of yes/no-questions with remember
than the PS mothers did (t(55)  2.59, p  0.05);1 see Fig. 1.
Subordinate clause type
Three repeated-measures ANOVAs examined the frequency with which think, know
and remember occurred in the input relative to the children’s preschool status, age
and maternal subordinate clause type (Preschool x Age x Clause Type). For the verb
think, only the main effect of subordinate clause type emerged (F(3, 159)  156.39,
p  0.001, partial 2  0.86), in that mothers used think at significantly higher per-
centages with a finite clause than utterances without a subordinate clause at all
(27.7% vs. 6.77%; t(56)  11.34, p  0.001), which appeared significantly less
often than those with a subjunctive clause (2.3%; t(56)  4.62, p  0.001). Similar
results were found for the verb know. There was a main effect of subordinate clause
type (F(3, 159)  85.80, p  0.001, partial 2  0.85), such that know utterances
with a finite subordinate clause or no subordinate clause appeared at significantly
higher percentages than utterances with a subjunctive clause (t(56) 12.41,
p  0.001, t(56)  12.57, p  0.001, respectively). A main effect of subordinate
clause type was also found for remember (F(3, 159)  50.64, p  0.001, partial 2 
0.69), in that remember utterances with a finite subordinate clause or no subordi-
nate clause appeared at significantly higher percentages than utterances with a sub-
junctive clause (t(56)  8.60, p  0.001; t(56)  8.98, p 0.001, respectively).
Person
For the verb think, a repeated measures ANOVA (Age x Preschool x Person) revealed
a significant main effect of person (F(2, 106)  70.96, p  0.001, partial 2  0.83).
Think appeared at significantly higher percentages in the form of first person
(24.7%) than second person (11.8%), which, in turn, appeared at significantly
higher percentages than third person (0.7%; t(56)  5.19, p  0.001; t(56)  8.42,
p  0.001, respectively). For the verb know, a main effect of person again emerged
(F(2, 106)  37.69, p  0.001, partial 2  0.71), with know appearing at signifi-
cantly higher percentages in the form of first (18%) and second person (17%)
compared with third person (2%; t(56)  8.77, p  0.001; t(56)  8.16, p  0.001,
respectively);2 see Fig. 2. Similarly, a main effect of person was found for the
verb remember (F(2, 106)  88.19, p  0.001, partial 2  0.68), which appeared
at significantly higher percentages in the form of second person (16%) compared
with first (3%; t(56)  8.82, p  0.001), which, in turn, occurred a higher per-
centage of the time than third person (0.2%; t(56)  5.02, p  0.001);3 see Fig. 2.
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Figure 1 The proportion of wh-questions, yes/no-questions, statements and
directives containing think, know and remember out of the total number
of mental verb utterances
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Figure 2 The proportion of first, second and third person utterances containing
think, know and remember out of the total number of mental verb 
utterances ( indicates p  0.08)
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Finally, we examined the group differences concerning the certainty of think state-
ments using a non-parametric test (a test not affected by the fact that each group’s
certainty codings summed to 100%). The percentages of ‘very certain’, ‘certain’,
‘uncertain’ and ‘very uncertain’ uses out of the total number of think statements are
shown in Fig. 3. The modal use of think was its ‘certain’ form for all mothers; how-
ever, notice that ‘very certain’ uses comprised a greater percentage in the PS mothers
compared with the NPS mothers (25% vs. 5%). Indeed, a Mann-Whitney U analy-
sis revealed that PS mothers used think significantly more in its ‘very certain’ form
than the NPS mothers (U  46.0, p  0.05).
In sum, both think and remember occurred most commonly in the form of state-
ments overall, while remember appeared most commonly as a yes/no-question.
Moreover, two interactions were found with the preschool variable: the NPS children
overall heard significantly higher percentages of yes/no-questions with remember
compared with the PS children, and the three-year-old NPS children heard a smaller
percentage of statements with know than the PS children of the same age. The
majority of utterances with think, know and remember appeared with either a finite
clause or no clause at all; very few subjunctives occurred. A higher percentage of
think utterances were in the first person (e.g., ‘I think the door is closed.’), whereas
know utterances appeared at similar high rates in the first and second person (e.g.,
‘I know where it is.’ and ‘You know where to put it.’). A higher percentage of remem-
ber utterances were in the second person (e.g., ‘Do you remember?’). The non-
parametric analyses further revealed more specific verb, person, and utterance-type
differences between the two groups of mothers of three-year-olds.1–4 Finally, the PS
mothers used think significantly more often in its ‘very certain’ sense than the NPS
mothers did (e.g., I think you should try and finish one game and then play with him).
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Figure 3 The percentage of certainty codings for think uses out of the total number
of think statements
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How maternal conversations predict child performance
The next question of interest concerned the extent to which the variation in aspects
of maternal conversations might account for individual differences in the children
within and across groups. To investigate this, regression analyses were conducted.
Due to the relatively small sample size, correlational analyses were employed to
determine the maternal input variables that were significantly related to the child
outcome variables before entering them into the regression model. This ensured
that the case-to-independent-variable ratio remained as large as possible
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The correlation matrix for this study indicated that
directives with think, wh-questions and statements with know, and know and
remember utterances without a subordinate clause were all significantly related
to children’s outcome measures. Regression analyses were then performed using
the significant maternal input variables as predictors to determine the amount of
variance each contributed to the children’s mental verb and false belief outcomes.
Regressions
Hierarchical regression, containing all 57 mother-child dyads (three- and four-year-
olds), was used to examine the extent to which aspects of maternal conversations
contribute to children’s variance in their (a) mental verb scores and (b) false belief
scores, over and above the children’s age and language ability. The preschool vari-
able (0  NPS; 1 PS) was initially included in all the regression analyses; however,
this variable did not significantly predict any of the child outcome variables.
Therefore, it is not included in any of the reported findings.
Because no input variables significantly correlated with children’s performance
on the two mental verb tasks combined, the first regression analysis contained the
children’s score only on the puppet mental verb task as the dependent variable (see
Table 6). The child’s age was entered in years and months as a decimal conversion
in Step 1 to control for the expected age effects. In Step 2, the raw total on the lan-
guage comprehension measure (TACL-3) was entered to account for the effects of
general language ability. Step 3 contained wh-questions with know, and step 4
contained statements with know. The final model was significant (F(4, 52)  4.21,
p  0.01) and explained 25% of the variance in mental verb understanding. Age,
entered as the first variable, explained a significant amount of variance (9%,  
0.37, p  0.01). Interestingly, in step 2, general language ability did not contribute
significantly to the prediction of mental verb understanding. However, know utter-
ances coded as wh-questions, entered in step 3, approached significance (  0.25,
p  0.06). Finally, statements with know further explained 9% of the variance in
children’s performance on the mental verb understanding task; however, this vari-
able negatively predicted children’s performance (  0.30, p  0.05).
To further investigate this finding, and because the PS effect for know state-
ments held only for first person,4 a second regression analysis was performed, using
know statements in the first, second and third person as the predictors. Again, chil-
dren’s score on the puppet mental verb task was entered as the dependent variable.
Age and language ability were again entered in steps 1 and 2. Steps 3–5 contained
know statements in the third person, know statements in the second person and
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know statements in the first person (see Model II of Table 6). Of the three variables,
know statements in the first person are the only type of utterance to significantly
(negatively) predict children’s mental verb understanding (  0.31, p  0.05).
For the regression analysis predicting children’s false belief performance, children’s
total false belief score (0–4) was entered as the dependent variable (see Table 7). Age
was entered as a control in step 1, while children’s raw score on the TACL-3 was
again entered in step 2. The remaining predictors were based on significant pairwise
correlations and included know utterances without a subordinate clause (entered in
Table 6 Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for variables predicting 
performance on the puppet mental verb task (N  57)
Step Variable B SE B b R2
Model 1
1 Age 0.98 0.41 0.31* 0.09
2 Age 0.88 0.55 0.27
TACL-3 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.00
3 Age 0.90 0.54 0.28
TACL-3 0.00 0.02 0.04
Wh-q knowa 16.32 8.17 0.25 0.06
4 Age 1.18 0.53 0.37*
TACL-3 0.00 0.02 0.01
Wh-q know 15.30 7.82 0.24
Statement knowb 4.24 1.73 0.30* 0.09
Model II
1 Age 0.98 0.41 0.31* 0.09
2 Age 0.88 0.55 0.27
TACL-3 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.00
3 Age 1.08 0.54 0.34*
TACL-3 0.00 0.02 0.00
3rd per. K stc 0.455 4.59 0.13 0.02
4 Age 0.97 0.57 0.30
TACL-3 0.00 0.02 0.00
3rd per.K st 4.52 4.59 0.13
2nd per.K std 6.61 6.75 0.14 0.02
5 Age 0.97 0.57 0.30
TACL-3 0.00 0.02 0.01
3rd per.K st 5.58 4.41 0.16
2nd per.K st 3.86 6.56 0.08
1st per. K ste 4.54 1.89 0.31* 0.09
 p 0.06; * p 0.05.
a know utterances coded as wh-questions; b know utterances coded as statements; c third person
know statements; d second person know statements; e first person know statements.
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step 3), directives with think (entered in step 4), remember utterances without a sub-
ordinate clause (entered in step 5) and remember statements (entered in step 6). The
model was significant (F(6, 50)  7.34, p  0.001) and explained 47% of variance
in the false belief scores. Age, entered in step 1, explained 18% of the variance
(  0.43, p  0.01). Children’s performance on the TACL-3 accounted for 10% of
the variance (  0.42, p  0.01). Above age and language ability, know utterances
without a subordinate clause significantly predicted 6% of the variance (  0.25,
p  0.05). Although think directives in the next step did not contribute significantly
to the model, remember utterances without a subordinate clause explained 9% of
the variance in children’s false belief performance (  0.31, p  0.01). And finally,
remember statements did not contribute significantly to the model. However, it is
important to note that if remember statements are entered in the step before
remember utterances without a subordinate clause, then they do contribute signifi-
cantly to the model (  0.25, p  0.05). Moreover, when remember utterances
without a subordinate clause are entered in the last step, the contribution to the
model is not as strong (  0.26, p  0.055).
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this study was to investigate how maternal uses of mental verbs in
conversation with their children might relate to those children’s developing abilities
to distinguish between mental verbs and to acquire a theory of mind. The children’s
performance on the MV and false belief tasks was consistent with previous findings
in the literature. That is, the four-year-olds performed above chance on both men-
tal verb and false belief tasks, and significantly better than the three-year-olds, who
performed at chance (see also Moore et al., 1989; Wellman, 1990). Moreover, the
children’s performance on the MV and false belief tasks was intercorrelated
(see also Brown et al., 1996; Moore et al., 1990), as was their performance on these
tasks and their general language ability (see also Astington, 2000). Importantly for
our desire to study a sample with considerable variance, we also found that within
the three-year-old group, those who attended preschool performed less well on the
puppet mental verb task than those who did not attend preschool. Thus, our child
participants performed as expected, and generated enough variance to support
expectations of differences among their mothers in mental verb use. However, it is
important to note, that although the preschool status of the children created vari-
ance in both child outcomes and maternal speech, preschool status itself did not
predict any variance in children’s outcome measures. It is possible that the fairly
wide range of PS experiences in our sample (i.e., 3 to 40 hours/week) might have
yielded a less coherent group of children (e.g., NICHD Early Child Care Research
Network, 2000, 2007).
Our next four findings related more directly to our primary purpose, which con-
cerned the type of maternal mental verb input that may be related to children’s
understanding of the mental world. First, group comparisons and regression analy-
ses demonstrated that questions were facilitative whereas statements were
inhibitory with respect to learning mental verb distinctions. These findings support
HOWARD ET AL.: MATERNAL CONVERSATIONS AND MENTAL VERBS
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those of Adrian et al. (2007), who also found facilitatory effects for maternal ques-
tions. They do not support a positive role for statements, contrary to Slaughter
et al.’s (2007) findings; however, Slaughter et al. reported a positive role only for a
very specific type of statement (cognitive clarifications). We conjecture that ques-
tions containing mental verbs are facilitative because they bring children’s attention
to specific meanings, namely, their own mentation. For example, a mother who
asks her child ‘What do you know about this game?’ is explicitly drawing the child’s
attention to his/her own mental experience, and providing labels to help to distin-
guish different aspects of that mental experience, and thus helping distinguish the
mental verbs.
Second, one of the strongest findings, evident in both the group comparisons and
the regression, is that the use of mental verbs in reference to others rather than one-
self facilitates children’s acquisition of distinctions between mental verbs. These find-
ings corroborate and extend those of Booth et al. (1997); moreover, because our
VOLUME 28 ISSUE 4
396
FIRST
LANGUAGE
Table 7 Table summary of hierarchical regression analysis for variables predicting
false belief performance (N  57)
Step Variable B SE B  R2
1 Age 0.99 0.29 0.43** 0.18
2 Age 0.35 0.36 0.15
TACL-3 0.03 0.01 0.42** 0.10
3 Age 0.32 0.35 0.14
TACL-3 0.03 0.01 0.40*
NoCl knowa 2.80 1.28 0.25* 0.06
4 Age 0.41 0.34 0.18
TACL-3 0.02 0.01 0.35*
NoCl know 2.47 1.27 0.22
Directive Tb 25.73 14.86 0.20 0.04
5 Age 0.10 0.34 0.04
TACL-3 0.03 0.01 0.46**
NoCl know 2.83 1.20 0.25*
Directive T 25.52 13.94 0.20
NoCl rememberc 5.60 1.97 0.31**
6 Age 0.02 0.36 0.01
TACL-3 0.03 0.01 0.47**
NoCl know 2.93 1.21 0.26*
Directive Tb 24.11 14.14 0.19
NoCl rememberc 4.67 2.36 0.26
Statement Rd 1.49 2.06 0.10 0.01
p  0.06; * p  0.05; ** p  0.01
a know utterances without a subordinate clause; b think directives; c remember utterance without a
subordinate clause; d remember statements
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child measures were drawn independently from the maternal conversations, the rela-
tion between the two cannot be attributable to priming, or to topic choices that
elicit specific verb uses from the child. Instead, it seems likely that mothers who
talk more about the mental states of others facilitate their children’s understanding
of the different perspectives that different people might have – themselves included.
These findings corroborate those of Adrian et al. (2007) and help to refine the theor-
etical stance of Dunn & Brophy (2005; see also Harris, 2005; Montgomery, 2002),
that maternal conversations enable the introduction of different points of view.
Specifically, this seems to be accomplished by conversations that explicitly discuss the
mental states of others. The link from such different perspectives to distinctions
between mental verbs is not yet fully elaborated, however, because reference to oth-
ers’ mental states does not mandate the use of different verbs. Perhaps, though,
children who hear more about the mental states of others become more quickly
attuned to the ways these mental states are described – primarily, by different verbs.
On this account, different person forms used in maternal conversations may draw
children’s attention to the fact that verb meanings differ, but are not necessarily
revealing about what the actual semantic differences are.
Our third major finding concerns the importance of know and remember in
single-clause utterances, regardless of type. The fact that remember emerged as a
positive predictor in the false belief regression may be partly attributable to the fact
that the majority of these utterances (55–70% across groups) were indeed ques-
tions (e.g., ‘Do you remember the card?’). Mothers who ask their children more
about their own remembering may be stimulating the children to reflect on those
mental processes, bringing them closer to conscious awareness and highlighting
how they differ in different situations. However, there are two hedges: (1) remem-
ber statements contribute similar amounts of variance as single clause remember
utterances, and (2) fewer single-clause know utterances were questions (27–29%
across groups). Therefore, another reason that these utterances may have emerged
as positive predictors is that because they are single-clause utterances, they are
short and simple. As a consequence, children need not spend time processing the
subordinate clause of the sentence; they can instead focus on the mental aspect of
the sentence (e.g., ‘You know that’, ‘You have to remember’).
The one aspect of maternal conversation that could directly relate to children’s
good performance on the mental verb tasks is the proportion of ‘very certain’ uses
of think (e.g., ‘I think you’ve had enough peas for now’). Naigles (2000) had con-
jectured that mothers who used think more in its ‘comment’ sense, while perfectly
appropriate, were providing multiple instances of how think could be used similarly
to know, rather than as less certain than know. In support, we found that think in
its ‘very certain’ sense was more common in the maternal input of the PS children,
whose performance on the puppet mental verb task was lower than that of the NPS
children. However, this relationship between ‘very certain’ uses and outcome per-
formance held only for the group analyses. In other words, percentage of ‘very
certain’ uses was not significantly related to children’s performance on the puppet
mental verb task, or any other output measures.
Therefore, children do seem to have a clear understanding of the meaning of
think (and thus the certainty of think) to perform well on the puppet task. But it is
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also possible that children need only hear some relatively small proportion of think
uses in their ‘canonical’ uncertain sense to reach some threshold of realization such
that when mental verbs are contrasted (as in our mental verb tasks), the point of
contrast is presumed to be the level of certainty. This possibility could be further
explored with an experimental manipulation.
Taken together, our detailed examination of the way(s) mothers used mental
verbs in conversation has proved to be quite fruitful, discovering positive effects of
questions, reference to others and level of certainty. Only the subjunctive clauses
yielded no effects; however, these were also extremely rare in our dataset, either
because they are rare overall in maternal conversations or because we did not
record the types of situations in which subjunctive clauses might be heard.
Three other findings from the study, while not central to its goals, are also
worthy of some discussion. First, why were the mothers who did not send their
three-year-old children to preschool the ones who used mental verbs in more ways
that seemed facilitative of their acquisition? This ‘nonpreschool’ effect cannot be
attributed to SES because both groups were primarily college-educated. Moreover,
the findings from the literature related to preschool attendance have generally
found that it is children who do attend preschool who perform better and/or have
more engaged and didactic parents (e.g., Naigles, 2000; NICHD Early Child Care
Research Network, 2007; Rogoff et al., 1991; Vinden, 2002). We conjecture that
within the middle-to-upper SES bracket, mothers of three- and four-year-olds exer-
cise a deliberate choice, either to send their children to preschool, with all its atten-
dant cognitive and social benefits, or to keep them at home, with the mothers
themselves providing the benefits. Thus, mothers of three-year-olds who do not
send their children to preschool may deliberately focus their conversations on
the types of didactic interaction that they assume children who go to preschool are
possibly receiving from their teachers.
Second, why were so few environmental influences (i.e., from maternal con-
versations) seen with the four-year-olds compared with the three-year-olds?
While the four-year-olds did not perform perfectly on the tasks, their perfor-
mance was consistently above chance. Therefore, because most of the four-
year-olds were demonstrating some understanding of mental states, the variance in
the type of maternal mental verb speech might not be as high as in the three-
year-olds. In other words, the way in which mothers use mental state verbs might
be influenced not only by the child’s mental state speech, but by the child’s 
mental state understanding. Therefore, mothers of three-year-olds might be more
sensitive to what their child is understanding (or not) and adjust their speech
accordingly (e.g., more questions than statements), whereas mothers of four-year-
olds need not make such adjustments. Similarly, another possibility is that the
aspects of maternal conversation we examined are those that are most relevant 
earlier in development. Questions, references to others, and using think less in its
‘very certain’ sense may help three-year-olds because they are currently engaged in
learning how people have different perspectives, how they can reflect on their
own mental states and how degrees of certainty are mapped onto the verbs think,
guess and know. Further developments in MV understanding and ToM (e.g., Booth
and Hall, 1995) may be attributable to different aspects of maternal conversations.
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Thus, it seems that at least some of the facilitating aspects of maternal con-
versations that we have examined are important properties of the input of less
rather than more advanced children. A further possibility as to why we found
preschool difference among the three-year-olds but not the four-year-olds could be
attributable to something inherently different about mothers who choose not to
send their children to preschool when they are four versus three years of age.
However, a more detailed study would better distinguish what these differing
parenting philosophies might be.
Therefore, the limitations of the study include the absence of younger children
(i.e., children two years of age), as well as the use of a cross-sectional rather than
longitudinal design. A longitudinal design including a greater age range would have
allowed for more detailed analyses of the children’s mental verb production in rela-
tion to the maternal input, because the utterances for the mother and child would
not have been drawn from the same conversation. Moreover, a longitudinal design
would have enabled analyses revealing how earlier maternal conversations actually
influence subsequent child mental verb use. Finally, if more children overall had
been included, then separate regression analyses could have been conducted for
each age group, making it possible to examine whether different aspects of con-
versations are more important in predicting children’s mental verb and false belief
performance, depending on the age of the child.
In sum, these findings provide a more detailed account of just how maternal
conversations may be informative for children learning about mental verbs and false
beliefs. Importantly, we did not find one overarching aspect that could serve as the
‘key’ to children’s developments at this age, but rather have highlighted a compila-
tion of forms and senses that may each provide smaller pieces to the big picture
(i.e., more questions, more second person utterances – especially short ones – with
remember, fewer very certain forms with think). Future directions might include
experimental manipulations of some of these pieces, as well as further scrutiny of
maternal conversations to discover other aspects that contribute to later develop-
ments in children’s understanding of the mental world.
NOTES
1. Among the three-year-olds, the NPS mothers used a higher percentage of yes/no-ques-
tions containing remember than the PS mothers did (U  46.5, p  0.05).
2. The PS mothers of three-year-olds tended to use a higher percentage of first person
know utterances than the NPS mothers did (U  64, p  0.08).
3. The NPS mothers of three-year-olds used a significantly higher percentage of remem-
ber utterances in the second person than the PS mothers did (U  55.5, p  0.05).
4. Pairwise Mann-Whitney Us also compared person effects by specific utterance types.
The PS mothers of three-year-olds tended to use a higher percentage of know
statements in the first person compared with the NPS children (Ms  21% and 12%,
respectively; U  60.5, p  0.06), whereas, the NPS mothers used a higher percentage
of yes/no-questions in the second person with remember than the PS mothers did
(Ms  15% and 7%, respectively; U  46.50, p  0.05). No other person differences at
the utterance type level were found.
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